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Monday, September 25, 2017

Film Review: Michigan Changing the Handoff Point

At some point on Saturday, the Michigan vs. Purdue matchup turned into a battle of "who can out execute you" vs "who can out scheme you". Jeff Brohm utilized some wonderfully designed misdirection plays to get guys open in space, while Michigan was confident they could line up and wear the Boilermakers down via execution. But as the game wore on and the two teams continued to play nearly equally, Michigan pulled out a change up that allowed them to get a walk-in touchdown. In this post, I want to look at some little things that happen in the Michigan run game that impact the defense's reaction.

Bryon Fuller/MGoBlog

RB Lead vs FB Dive
I want to start by demonstrating that this sort of activity is not limited to a single game. In fact, the most basic way Harbaugh manipulates the handoff point is by running Lead Plays to the RB and FB dives to the FB.

The difference between the FB and RB isn't so much the area where the offense is attacking, rather, it's the timing of the play and how the defense must react. Michigan has continued to have success running FB Dive with Hill, so here's a play in which they run Lead Duo with Hill as a lead blocker (note Hill's excellent lead block as well).




What sticks out is how the LBs react. Yes, this play does go outside an additional gap compared to where the FB dive would go. But this formation is classic "Dive" formation for Michigan.



And both Inside LBs immediately attack at the snap to snuff out the Dive. Only it isn't a dive, and both LBs have immediately taken themselves out of the play and allowed themselves to be sealed inside. The FB Dive and Duo are core playcalls in Michigan's offense, but by running both from similar looks and the difference in timing between the FB Dive and handing it off to the RB, you've caused the defense to get out of position and allowed for enough of a gap for Michigan to pick up the first down.

See in this freeze frame how both LBs have stuck their noses inside, and taken themselves out of the actual run lane.



Counter Iso Under Center vs Gun
Here's another example, albeit in a different form. What Michigan is showing here is the same play (Counter Iso), but one comes from under center while the other comes from shotgun. For the offense, and the blocking, the play is the same. For the defense, and the tendencies they've studied on film and prepared for when an offense is under center vs when it's in Gun, this small change can really impact your reaction.

Here is the play under center.




And here it is a week later out of Shotgun.




Handoff vs Pitch
Last, let's look not at changing the ball carrier or at changing the backfield formation, instead, let's look at changing how the ball gets to the RB's hands.

Under Harbaugh, Michigan (and the 49ers, and Stanford) have always run a Lead G/T Sweep play that looks like this.


This play basically always includes a few things: typically three receivers (some combination of WRs, TEs, and FBs) lined up playside, either in a tight bunch or in a wing with a FB behind; either a guard or a tackle pulling outside an leading the RB into the hole (depending on defensive alignment or offensive personnel); a FB or H-back blocking the first off-color he sees (be it kicking him outside or sealing him inside); and a pitch.

Here's how it's diagrammed



A typically counter to this play is Counter H. This allows Michigan to line up in the same formation and give the same initial motion from the RB, but attack the opposite side of the field (it also can pull the same OL, which is a nice feature as sometimes a defender will see a puller and it can take a moment to diagnose the direction he's going; that hesitation can help set up the blocks well).



It looks like this (note the same trips alignment).


They can also run Inside Zone or really most of their playbook (Power, Duo, Stretch, Wham, etc.) from this look, but the Inside Zone aspect will become important.


Now against Purdue, Michigan has been lining up and formations that often result in Lead T. Purdue is reacting to this by flying up on the edge. Here's what you're getting, DBs setting hard edges and LBs flowing fast.



This would happen multiple times. So what do you do?


So what are we looking at here? A few things. Note the formation (common Lead T). Also note the split flow from the H-back that looks a lot like the path for Counter H. This is play is actually just Split Inside Zone, an inside zone play.

It is this, but with a pitch and a tweaked formation


So what is the defense seeing, because that's what allows for that huge hole to develop. The defense really sees two things, depending on what side of the red line they are aligned on (note, that isn't necessarily what they should be keying, but motion and pre-snap alignment draws their eyes based on tendency; also note that #5 has no idea what he's really looking at here, he defies conventional wisdom and just following the H probably because he was told "when they line up in this formation, the FB/HB will take you to the ball").



And here it is mid-pitch. One half of the defense is reading Lead T, the other half is reading Counter H. Neither is correct. All the offense has done is run split zone, but with a pitch, which results in the RB getting the ball deep, seeing a hole, and running downhill as quickly as he can.




And here's the end result


Conclusion
Changing the handoff point can really effect the defense, even if it doesn't have a large impact on the offensive play or play design. You can change the person you give it to in order to change the timing, change the backfield look to dictate a defensive formation or mess with their keys or counter your tendencies, or something as simple as a pitch can impact how a defense reacts immediately to a play. These are small changes, but they can lead to big results.
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Friday, September 15, 2017

Film Study: Michigan Duo and Counter Iso vs D Focus on Stopping Interior Run

From the recent Upon Further Review - Michigan Offense vs Florida Defense a couple plays came up that I think could benefit from a bit more depth.

In this article, we talk Duo



And Counter Iso




Background
In this game, Michigan has been struggling quite a bit with allowing quick penetration from the DL. This penetration was worst on the right side of the OL, mostly from 3-technique DTs or DEs spiking from a 7-technique into a 5-technique post snap.

Duo



From Zach Dunn link below




This play was the offseason play du hour which everyone many seemed to write about (I'll link some at the bottom of this section). It's Power without the pulling OG. It gets doubles at two locations along the OL, including at the point of attack, and FB kicks the EMOL while the RB read the MIKE (if he crashes down, the RB bounces). This specific play is blown up because the double between the RG and RT doesn't get any push, leaving the MIKE free. If one of those guys gets out on the MIKE, the RB then has a safety one on one with some room to either cut inside the FB or bounce outside to grass.

James Light (I've linked him; follow him on Twitter, he's a great X's and O's follow) has posted some cut ups, including from Michigan, that are worth embedding.



In fact, at the time James Light even detailed the difference between Iso and Duo quite well




With some Iso examples


And Duo examples




(In this case, this is a "Lead" Duo play, the H-back kicks out the EMOL, the FB leads to the playside LB. In nomenclature I use, this is Called Power F because it's a basically a Power O play but the FB replaces the Opposite Guard on the playside LB block).



Zach Dunn was one of the main drivers of this play being talked about so much. Here's his post, focused mostly on a single back version of the play.

It includes former NFL Guard Geoff Schwartz (good follow if you're interested in getting more into OL twitter) video discussing it (he was the other primary driver of this play getting so much attention, IMO)




Counter Iso







This play isn't Iso as most know it, though it is an iso play with an important distinction. On Iso, the FB is isolating a playside LB, but here, he is blocking the backside LB and sealing him in the direction the RB is initially going. This is a designed cut back known as "Counter Iso" or "Lead Counter" or "BOB" or "Blast" (or a million other names), depending on where you hear it.

Like Iso (and unlike Duo), you are only reliant on one double, and in this case, that double doesn't even have to get a ton of vertical movement. Here, the LG and C are doubling the NT with the LG combo blocking off to get to the playside (playside in this case is the initial RB direction) LB. Meanwhile the FB is working through the LOS to get to the backside LB. The playside of the OL seals the defense further playside, the backside of the OL seals the DL to the backside. Other than the NT, if the DL wants to get penetration, they are really only taking themselves out of a quickly developing run play.

There isn't a lot elsewhere regarding this play that I've been able to find so I'll go through this specific play step-by-step.

Pre-snap, Florida's DTs are shifted over to strength. The DE has pinched inside at 5-technique and the SAM is lined up on the edge.



The WR goes and motion and the CB alerts the safety to a potential crack block. This is done by design by the offense, to get the CB/Safety/SAM potentially thinking crack sweep and attempting to take them out of the play as their initial footwork is to challenge upfield to defend against the strongside sweep, and also just to give the WR a better angle to the safety. UF calls it out but doesn't really get impacted immediately, and actually it puts the CB's eyes in the backfield (looking for crack exchange) and when he reads run he lets the WR go to the Safety (he's eventually the free defender that limits this play; but RB vs CB in a gap is not the worst option).

Now, also note the direction the QB turns out of the pocket. The RB is going in that direction as well (to the weakside of the formation). This, in combination with the double at the point of attack, give the look of a weakside inside zone. But then note the backside of the play. They are not zone blocking. They are not doubling and working to the second level, they are not zone stepping at the snap, they are gap blocking. The 3-technique has already gotten penetration, and the RG allows the DT to take himself out of the play and simply buries him. The RT and TE both down block the defenders lined up outside of them.



The handoff has pulled the LBs to the playside. This allows the angle for the LG (who really only mimicked a double at the point of attack before releasing) and the FB to have adventageous angles in an effort to seal the LBs to the playside. Again, this is a designed cut back. The LG can't quite get out on time to maintain his block and gets juked a bit, but he's forced the LB to react to a run in his direction, and effectively enough taken him out of the play.

The other thing I like to note about this still image is the placement of the FB's helmet. He gets his head on the backside of the LB to seal him back inside. Because this LB is biting to get playside, the FB is going to use his momentum against him, seal him inside, and give his RB a great read.



Eventually the SAM gets off his block with the TE (the TE allowed the SAM's hands to get inside of him, allowing him to relatively easily disengage from the block) and the CB comes down to combine for the tackle, but not until after an 8 yard gain, and threatening more.

Why These Two Plays
First, Duo. The idea here is that you are getting a double team at the point of attack, and the two blockers converging on the 3-technique can limit his penetration. It does, but neither of them get out to the second level, and that generally limits the play. The penetration was still enough to disrupt the timing of the block because they were never really able to start driving the DT and release off (they both wanted to maintain the double because they weren't getting push). The other aspect of this is that UF was playing to take away the interior run but was allowing plays to bounce as they repeatedly failed to set the edge effectively. Duo is a great run play in that the play design allows for the bounce against teams focusing on taking away the interior run. In this case it didn't work, but you would see the bounce effectively throughout the game.

So on the Counter Iso, they can now use this penetration against the defense. Any DL to the backside of the play are only burying themselves out of the play design immediately at the snap. Similarly, the OL doesn't need to worry about working a combo to the second level, instead, they focus on one game and focus only on not allowing the DL to cross their face, everything else is gold. So this play mitigates some of the advantages UF had against the right side of Michigan's OL. I like this play especially because the handoff is on the opposite side of where the ball carrier is going to go and mimics a quick hitting downhill run. Because of that, it really forces the defense to react, but that reaction just sets up the angles to help spring a big play.
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Wednesday, September 6, 2017

Film Review: 2017 OSU vs Indiana - Fade, Back Shoulder, and a Coverage Adjustment

AP Photo/ Darron Cummings

For nearly a half of play, the Indiana Hoosiers looked poised to make the Buckeyes sweat out a potential early season massive upset. It wouldn't be the first time a team came out with a great gameplan earlier in the year and caught an opponent looking ahead to the supposed bigger challenge.

With the Ohio State on defense, the Buckeyes wanted to come out in a lot of single-high defensive looks, predominately Cover 1, put bodies near the LOS, and out athlete Indiana. In the battle of the DL vs OL, OSU dominated. But on the outside, despite relatively good position from defensive backs, Indiana executed nearly perfectly. One could argue that the execution was bound to wane, but repeatedly throwing one of two throws - a fade or a back shoulder fade to the boundary - allowed IU QB Richard Lagow to find an easily repeatable rhythm, particularly with big bodied and sure-handed WR Simmie Cobbs.

In this article (and the next) we will look at the basic gameplans going into the game and how the Buckeyes made adjustments to turn a close fought game into a 2nd half blowout.

OSU Defense vs Indiana Offense
The Buckeyes were adamant about threatening pressure with their LBs and playing press on the outside with a single high safety. The first few snaps of the game they came out in a 3-3 nickel look:



Here they could send pressure off both edges with straight man elsewhere, blitz from the MIKE and play a funnel coverage between the two OLBs and the RB, or drop one or two LBs into the hole or curl zones to take away short routes underneath. All of these are various Cover 1 techniques with the LBs.

They would revert to more of their traditional 4 man fronts with a variety of looks from the DL, but the concept in coverage remained the same



The OSU changeup in the first half consisted mostly of throwing out a Cover 3 wrinkle or bringing pressure from the LBs (I'll touch on this in a second). In this case they used a Safety Robber and inverted their safeties late.



But this, for the most part, left the Buckeyes susceptible to the same Indiana attack, with one read, and one of two throws.

So let's take a look closer.

OSU in Cover 1

While in the box OSU is threatening various LBs at the LOS, the coverage is not hidden at all. The Buckeyes are daring Indiana with this coverage and don't care if IU knows what they are running. This is Cover 1, press on the outside, athlete vs athlete.



We see a CB that is in decent position, basically even to slightly behind the WR, but in a spot where he can basically control the WR with his hands and potentially make a play on any throw behind the receiver. So a fade is thrown. Because of the positioning of the CB - shoulders square to the WR - he is in a better position to defend the back shoulder throw but in a difficult position to get in-phase with the WR, control him with his body, and be able to make a play on a fade without PI.



The ball is a little under thrown, and the receiver makes a great play. Solid coverage, not perfect, and that leaves a little opening for a receiver to make a play and a CB unable to locate the football.



A little later, again in the 3-3 defense, and again, no question about the coverage.



At the throw, the WR has a step on the defender, shields him with his off hand, and the CB can't catch up after his turn the WR running vertically immediately at the snap.





Ok, we ain't hiding anything here.



The CB gets over the top of the WR pretty well, so the back shoulder throw is the read. But here the CB times his hands and eyes with the WR's motion to make a catch and is able to break up the pass.



And more of the same





So you're starting to get the idea





That's not bad coverage, but still, a completion. IU knows what's coming. Different formations, more of the same coverage from OSU, and IU picks up some key gains with rub routes (man beater) vs Cover 1. They could mix high percentage plays with their base attack vs what they knew they were going to get down-by-down from the Buckeyes



How OSU Planned on Stopping IU's Rhythm
I previously said two ways that Greg Shiano wanted to run as curveballs to the Cover 1 fastball: LB blitzing and Cover 3.

The LB blitzing didn't make sense in this game for two reasons. The purpose for blitzing is to get guy's in the QB's face and move him off his launch pad. Essentially, it breaks his rhythm by getting hits, hurrying up his footwork, or forcing him to move and not easily go through his progressions. However, 1) IU was running three step drops (with a fade, back shoulder, or a pick play attached, so the ball got out quick) so that the blitz never really got home in the 1st half; 2) The OSU DL was whooping IU's OL by themselves and getting pressure by themselves if the ball didn't get out. There was no need to add defenders to the pass rush that was already getting home quickly, they should have been added to the coverage.

The second curveball is a common one for Cover 1 teams, because at the snap it can easily look the same.



But here IU runs a comeback route to the sideline, so it's a similar throw for Lagow. It doesn't really give any help to the outside CB once the route structure takes form, so it doesn't really impact the QB reads.



Two High Safeties
So the Buckeyes come out in the same ol' same, right?



Well... they do a good job disguising it, but OSU is actually going to play Cover 2 (Red) down near the red zone, and it's going to result in an Interception.



There are some subtle hints (look at the outside-to-even alignment of the outside CBs on the WRs, the depth of the field safety, the width of the boundary safety, to name the most obvious but still subtle).

At the snap, look how quickly both safeties bail to their halves coverage, and also note how both CBs open up inside (allowing inside releases, they want their eyes on the QB).



As Lagow sees his WR to the boundary get over the top of the CB, he immediately wants to throw the fade. But now there is a safety over the top that he sees at the last second and hitches his throw. Toward the middle of the field, you have your zone beating concept. In this case, it's a crash concept. And it's open. Wide open. Even with sloppy routes. But Lagow never even looks, he's predetermined what throw he wants to make.



By the time he throws, this is his window



That's a CB sitting underneath and a safety right over the top, and a possibility of two defenders getting an INT with a ball thrown directly at the WR. The CB tips, the safety gets the pick, and crisis diverted for the Buckeyes.



Making the Adjustment
Now, I said all that, because OSU ran a Cover 2 scheme in the second quarter. But they didn't adjust the gameplan yet, that was just a curveball. They went back to their Cover 1 gameplan and continued to get torn up with the fade/back shoulder throw. This resulted in one TD drive and another that was nearing it until they returned to two high coverages (Cover 4 in this case just before IU could get into FG range). In the final two minute drive, IU again completed a back shoulder throw against Cover 1. So the full time adjustment didn't really take hold until the second half.



In the second half, OSU relied heavily on two high defenses, both Cover 2 and Cover 4. And their safeties hit the sideline hard, providing over the top help to their CBs and allowing the outside WRs to be bracketed.




This change forced Lagow to actually read the defense. It made his drops longer and made him stay in the pocket against an onslaught of pass rushers that were getting home. And when Single-High coverage was used behind a blitz, Lagow couldn't immediately turn and fire the fade or back shoulder throw, because it was no longer a foregone conclusion that it would be open. Once OSU made a change to a two high base, the Hoosiers quit moving the ball with sustained success. IU did have one drive where they completed back-to-back passes against Cover 2, but the success was few and far between.

Now, a couple things. Why didn't Schiano adjust earlier when it seemed obvious that his CBs were getting torn up on the outside? There are a few reasons: 1) OSU likely wants their base coverage to be Cover 1, it's likely what they repped most, it's likely what they feel is most adaptable to other teams on the schedule, and they have a young team; 2) Because of that youth, quickly adjusting the gameplan can lead to busts (and there were a couple coverage busts in the game) because guys aren't on the same page with what they are being asked to do. It's not just the coverage basics, but the details of techniques that often need to be reiterated to young players so that they execute the new scheme sufficiently; 3) The Buckeye's CBs weren't actually doing that bad, and as such, the Hoosier success could have been seen by Schiano as unsustainable. IU did sustain it for much of the half however, and the OSU change ups weren't working, so it became obvious at half that something needed to happen different.

The Ohio State coaching staff knows their team the best, they know their gameplan the best, and they know what and how they want to execute going forward. So it's easy to say they waited to long, but the reality is that is arm chair coaching.

There isn't likely to be another team on OSU's schedule that can execute this scheme quite as well. Oklahoma has a dangerous passing attack, but it's quite different. Many other teams on the schedule may be able to hold up against OSU's DL better than IU did (OSU's DL is the real deal though), and that may force OSU out of just running basic Cover 2 (and may be part of why they want to run Cover 1).

There are a lot of factors that go into game planning and season planning, but at the end of the day, Indiana did well to take advantage of the Buckeye's gameplan going into the game, but OSU was able to adjust and shut down the IU offense in the second half.
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